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Ihave been practising at the English Criminal Bar for 46years, and for 23 of them I was a British MP,concerning myself with the modernisation and
improvement of British criminal justice – of which I have
always felt very proud. Whether it is the best in the world
I cannot say, but it has certainly been universally admired
and copied by many countries.
At its heart has been the doctrine of the rule of law. This
has been anchored to the concepts of fairness and justice,
with its judges, juries and barristers standing ﬁrmly against
oppression by the state and its sometimes harsh laws,
whenever it threatens the liberty of the citizen. That is why,
before anyone can be convicted of crime and deprived of
that liberty, the state must satisfy ordinary jurymen and
women (or lay magistrates drawn from and representing
ordinary people), of that person’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. That is why our judges, who have risen through the
ranks of the lawyers practising daily in our courts, are
imbued through every ﬁbre of their judicial being with the
traditional principles of our common law, and so have been
able to use their own judgment or discretion when they
perceive any risk of injustice.
How then has it come about that a person convicted of a
crime involving ﬁnancial beneﬁt, has now been subjected
by Parliament, since the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, to a
law more draconian and manifestly unjust than anything
ever devised by the state in modern times? This is the law,
which now applies to what are called – erroneously –
conﬁscation proceedings.
It is difﬁcult to have any sympathy for ﬁnancial criminals
whose greed has led them to deprive their fellow citizens of
their hard- earned money. Indeed when I was ﬁrst invited
to make a keynote speech at this the annual Cambridge
International Symposium on Economic Crime 14 years
ago, I suggested that if we wanted to do something which
would seriously reduce crime, the courts, instead of just
imprisoning serious offenders, should deprive more of
them of the money (or their criminally funded possessions)
that they had derived from their crimes. I was a sponsor of
the Private Members’ Bill adopted by the Government
which extended the existing conﬁscation regime from drug
offences to other crimes, and as Chairman of the
Commons Home Affairs Select Committee I proposed that
our conﬁscation laws should be improved, extended, and
internationalised.
But I never envisaged – and nor, I think, did anyone else –
that when we came to develop those laws against fraudsters
and money-launderers, and to strengthen them against
drug-trafﬁckers and other illegal money-makers, that those
laws would be manifestly unjust. Principally, It is one thing
to punish an offender and also to deprive him of the
proceeds of his crime; it is quite another to deprive him of
property that is not the proceeds of crime. To put it
another way, it is one thing to punish a man severely for his
crime; it is quite another to punish him severely twice for
the same offence. Yet the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
perpetrates that injustice. As one eminent legal
commentator, has said of the laws that Parliament has since
passed: “These new laws appear to occupy some parallel
legal universe which has no apparent relationship with the
normal rules of criminal process.”
Under this statute, once a person has been convicted of
fraud, and sent to prison, for perhaps several years, he or
she can receive an additional prison sentence of up to 10
years if he or she fails to pay up whatever the court later
assesses to be the beneﬁt from the crime (for ease of style
I will use the male gender hereafter when referring to the
offender). There can be little wrong with such an
additional punishment as long as the money assessed
actually is his ill-gotten gain, and can still be retrieved from
wherever the offender has hidden it. But it is how that
beneﬁt is assessed under the new law that is so manifestly
unjust.
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REQUIREMENT TO REBUT “CRIMINAL
LIFESTYLE” ASSUMPTION
To begin with, even where someone of hitherto good
character is convicted of only one ﬁnancial offence, the
court is obliged to make an assumption that he has been
living a “criminal lifestyle” for six years. As a result, all of
the sources of his income and the money the convicted
person has invested, even those that have been perfectly
legitimate, in addition to money processed since
conviction and up to the conﬁscation proceedings, are
deemed to be “criminal money” and must be seized.
Furthermore, no-one else who has received any of that
“beneﬁt” has any right to it. So if the convicted person has
bought a house for himself or his wife and family, or a
business, or a car, or gifted money to his children over
those six years and since the trial out of money legitimately
obtained, he and they will lose those acquisitions or gifts or
whatever they are worth. As I have said, if they are truly the
proceeds of ill-gotten gains then it is not unfair that the
convicted person and his family should suffer in that way –
he should not have committed crime and should have
thought about the consequences for his family. But what if
he is not a thorough-going criminal and his only crime was
in truth the one for which he was convicted and
sentenced? The injustice is that under the new law the
“criminal lifestyle” assumption still has to be made – unless
he can rebut that assumption.
The trouble with requiring the offender to rebut that
assumption, even to the lesser standard of probability, is
that an innocent person may be in no position to discharge
such a burden. Even a good and efﬁcient businessman,
engaged in honest trade in this country, may not be able to
ﬁnd supporting witnesses if his trading partners have died
or gone to live somewhere untraceable in the South of
France and cannot be found. As for an honest but less than
efﬁcient businessman, who has not kept perfect records or
who may have lost them when his computer was stolen –
or who, through no fault of his own, happens to have some
dodgy customers – proving that his income was innocent
may be impossible. Or what of an international
businessman dealing in mobile phones, who can identify
the foreign business associates he wants and needs to call
to give evidence of his honesty, but who cannot do so
because they have no desire to come to this country lest
they too be arrested because of their business association
with a man convicted of ﬁnancial crime. Left alone without
witnesses, what chance has anyone got of persuading a
court that his denial of living a “criminal lifestyle” is
believable, once he has been found guilty by a jury or has
admitted to some act of serious dishonesty?
It is not only the transfer of the burden of proof, and the
assumption that accompanies it, which are so contrary to
the established precepts of British law. Because conﬁscation
proceedings have been held not to be penal and the
resulting deprivation of property is not a ﬁne, the defendant
is deprived of the protections he would otherwise receive
from criminal proceedings. The prosecution is able to rely
on evidence to prove that the defendant has beneﬁtted from
ill-gotten gains that would be inadmissible in a normal
criminal court! Reliance can be placed by the court on the
investigating ofﬁcer’s section 16 statement, which may
contain what was said in a co-defendant’s interview not in
the presence of this defendant. Contested witness
statements can be accepted as evidence. Even what the
investigating ofﬁcer may have picked up as hearsay
“information” from someone along the way is admissible!
PROPORTIONALITY AND DISCRETION
It gets worse! If someone is part of a gang defrauding social
welfare of £1 million over a period of time, and whose
personal beneﬁt has actually only been £400 –for which
crime he might not even have been sent to prison – he may
now be held to have beneﬁtted from the entire £1 million.
And, if the court accepts the prosecution allegation that he
must have that money hidden away somewhere, and he
fails to pay the £1 million, he could go to prison for 10
years! In one recent case involving a fraud of £3.2 million,
16 fraudsters had jointly invented bogus companies and
dishonestly pretended that they had paid VAT when they
had not done so. They were not required to pay back the
£3.2 million between them – which, on top of their
sentence of imprisonment, would have been fair enough –
but EACH had to pay back £3.2 million; a total of £51
million representing sixteen times the amount lost. If they
did not have that amount in their possession, or anything
like it, they potentially faced ending up in prison for an
additional 10 years.
In another of the most recent cases, the defendant was a
pharmacist who had over-reclaimed £464 out of a total
claim of £212,464, and the conﬁscation order made by the
Crown Court in the total sum of £212,464 was only
cancelled because the Court of Appeal was able to ﬁnd that
there had been an abuse of process.
Such a draconian statute surely plays havoc with the
concept of proportionality and the European Convention’s
right to peaceful enjoyment of a person’s possessions? Yet
it is doubtful whether recourse to the European Court of
Human Rights could be afforded by any defendant who
had been stripped of all his money, or that even if it did get
to that court, that it could be relied upon to put these
matters right.
Traditionally, under our criminal justice system, the judge
has nearly always had discretion before he sentences
someone: he can use his common sense. But under this
statute, because conﬁscation is not considered to be penal
and therefore as an additional sentence passed upon a
defendant, judicial discretion has been stripped away so
that, apart from where abuse of process can be found, it is
practically non-existent. If, for example, a defendant has,
before trial, handed back to the loser all of his ill-gotten
gains, the judge now has no discretion to take that into 23
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consideration before he makes the conﬁscation order.
Unusually, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is quite clear
on judicial discretion and the appeal courts have held that
it cannot be interpreted away to make room for such an
absurd element as common sense!
In fact the whole system seems to be geared against a
defendant in conﬁscation proceedings, for he may not be
able to properly prepare his defence. For a serious ﬁnancial
crime, he is likely on conviction to have been sentenced to
prison. If so, he will have little or no access to a computer,
so necessary in a complicated case, and all his business ﬁles
of documents will have been removed by HM Revenue and
Customs during the trial and not returned to him.
Furthermore, the prison system is in such a state that he
may be having to share a cell with other noisy and
distracting prisoners, he may not be allowed to have more
than one meeting a week with his legal advisers and that for
only a limited time, and he may ﬁnd himself having to share
a conference room with the visiting families of other
prisoners, having to shout against their noise and that of
reversing lorries outside the window of his conference
room. I speak from just such experience! What chance in
such circumstances has a defendant of concentrating on
documentary detail and explanations, still less of proving
anything against the odds to the satisfaction of a court?
OTHER INJUSTICES
Inevitably, slack and unjust rules breed other injustices.
The latest is the astonishingly irrelevant setting of targets.
The authorities now set targets for the number of
conﬁscation orders to be made in any geographical area of
the country and for the global amount they should be
seeking in compensation. How conceivably can that be
called justice?
So complicated and foreign to British practitioners are the
concepts and language of this conﬁscation legislation that,
in the words of the authors of one recent text-book on the
subject, “the appeal courts have continued to be occupied
in producing almost weekly judgements – most are
signiﬁcant, many are unreported, and some are
irreconcilable.” Another well-regarded commentator
writes of the impression being given that “some
prosecuting authorities have abandoned any pretence of
fulﬁlling a ‘minister of justice’ role in favour of taking full
advantage of what they appear to see as a revenue-raising
racket.”
To add insult to so much injury, those who allocate fees to
the publicly-funded criminal Bar have decided that this
section of the law is in future to be only worthy of half the
already grossly inadequate fees paid for the rest of the
criminal work: so barristers will not do the work and the
courts will have increasing difﬁculty in dealing with these
cases at all.
WHY?
How has this legally complicated, draconian and unjust
system come about? It is, I think, mainly because
Parliament does not spend enough time, or use enough
care, in vetting the laws put before it by civil servants and
politicians – goaded on as they are by the tabloid press with
little understanding of the consequences of what they do.
But it is also, surely, because there are now too few
practising lawyers in Parliament. It is now well nigh
impossible for an MP to be also a lawyer practising daily in
the courts. Looking after ever more demanding
constituents, in this new technological century of the
internet, e-mails and mobile phones, is quite enough of a
full-time job. So the people who know most about the
effect of the laws that are being passed, are no longer to be
found in Parliament advising the government or the
draughters of the legislation, or taking part themselves in
the making of good laws.
It may also be because our judges either do not make
representations to government about the failings of such
laws, or, if they do so privately, they are singularly
unsuccessful in persuading our masters of their folly!
Are there any lessons here for the criminal legal systems of
other countries? Perhaps there are not, if these
jurisdictions already have more just and more sensible
systems for depriving crooks of their ill-gotten gains. If that
is the case, then the UK should not be too proud to learn
from them! Of one thing I am sure – that when
considering the wide range of measures that must be
employed if we are to disrupt, deter or even stop the
organised crime that is costing us 3 per cent of our nation’s
GDP (a sum approaching £40 billion a year), a law which
is so contemptuous of our traditional ethical standards of
justice should not be one of them.
Perhaps – or am I dreaming – the next Conservative
Government might be persuaded to do something, drawing
on the beneﬁt of experience from overseas systems, to
ensure that criminals are deprived of their ill-gotten gains
by means which are fair and just, thereby removing this
blot on the UK’s reputation as a nation whose laws attain
only the highest standards.
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